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Abstract 
This article examines the emergence of a vocal and influential pro-Palestinian 
campaign within the Labour Party in the 1960s and 1970s.  In particular, it focuses 
upon the work of the Labour Middle East Council established by Christopher 
Mayhew in 1969.  The article argues that Mayhew succeeded in laying the 
foundations for a network of pro-Palestinian organisations in the 1980s but that the 
note of anti-Zionist radicalism which he introduced, provided a foothold for more 
controversial forms of activism within the mainstream Labour movement. 
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‘Mayhew’s Outcasts’ 
Anti-Zionism and the Arab lobby in Harold Wilson’s 
Labour Party 
 
Dr James R Vaughan 
 
This article focuses upon Christopher Mayhew’s campaign to generate support for the 
Palestinian cause in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s.   Before 1967, ‘Palestine’ 
was not a cause which attracted significant support within Labour circles and it was 
only with the creation of the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) in 1969 that 
Mayhew established the first of what would become a network of organisations 
linking the Labour and trade union movements to the wider Palestinian liberation 
campaign.  This achievement has been largely overlooked by historians who have 
tended to focus upon the 1980s as the decade in which levels of pro-Palestinian 
activism rose significantly.  This article argues that the success of pro-Palestinian 
organisations on the Left in the 1980s was founded upon the efforts of a dedicated 
group of campaigners, led by Mayhew, in the preceding decade.  The legacy of their 
work lies not only in the creation of an organised voice in support of the Palestinians 
on the contemporary British left, but also in the articulation of a new language of anti-
Zionism which, in some of its most influential aspects, does not always reflect greatly 
to the credit of those who developed it. 
 
Given Mayhew’s importance in the history of British anti-Zionism, it is striking that 
comparatively little attention has been paid to this aspect of his political career.  He 
has been rightly credited, during his time as a junior Minister in Ernest Bevin’s 
Foreign Office, with playing a central role in the establishment of Britain’s 
controversial Cold War propaganda agency, the Information Research Department 
(IRD).
1
  Historians have also found Mayhew notable for his association with the right-
wing of the Labour Party (he was among those dismissed as ‘Hampstead poodles’ by 
Richard Crossman in 1959) and his defection to the Liberal Party in 1974.
2
  His role 
as a leading British campaigner for the Palestinian cause, while sometimes 
acknowledged, has yet to attract detailed analysis.
3
   In recent accounts of the 
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European Left’s troubled relationship with Israel and Zionism, neither Colin Shindler 
nor Robert Wistrich mention Mayhew although this is perhaps unsurprising given that 
neither looks in detail at developments within the British Labour Party between 1948 
and the 1980s.
4
  Consequently, their books tend to support June Edmonds’ suggestion 
that there is a tendency prevalent among historians of anti-Zionism to focus their 
attention upon the hard left and the Communist Party rather than the centrist, social 
democratic tradition to which Mayhew belonged.
5
  
 
Edmonds has written a valuable study of Labour Party policy towards Israel which 
recognises Mayhew’s status as the Party’s ‘most notable advocate of the Arab cause’ 
in the 1960s and early 1970s.
6
  Nevertheless, she regards him as a peripheral figure in 
the longer-term history of pro-Palestinian activism and concludes that the kind of anti-
Zionism he represented remained ‘very marginal before the 1980s.’7  Accordingly 
Mayhew merits only brief mentions in her article on the post-1967 development of 
Labour Party policy towards the Arab-Israel dispute.
8
  Edmonds may be right in 
describing Mayhew as one of only a tiny minority of anti-Zionist Labour MPs in the 
1960s but her conclusion that ‘it was not until the early 1980s...that really significant 
change took place’9 both underestimates the achievements of anti-Israeli activists 
during the 1970s and downplays the role that Mayhew, together with Parliamentary 
allies such as Andrew Faulds and David Watkins, played in nurturing that activism.   
 
Mayhew’s first political contacts with the Zionist movement came with his 
appointment to the Foreign Office as Ernest Bevin’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State in 1946. Mayhew accepted this job knowing little about international 
relations and nothing whatsoever about the intricacies of the Palestine question.
10
  
Bevin’s opinions, however, were difficult to ignore and his attitudes towards Zionism 
and the Jewish people have been the subject of intense debate.  There have been 
those, such as Ian Mikardo, who have claimed that Bevin’s Palestine policy was 
distorted by the ‘fanatical hatred he developed for the Jews.’11 Others have argued 
that Bevin’s derogatory remarks about Zionists and Jews were more an exasperated 
response to the intense pressures of dealing with the situation in Palestine than a sign 
of racial prejudice. Alan Bullock has expressed this argument most succinctly, 
observing that ‘prejudice was cumulative, on both sides, making it more difficult for 
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Bevin to form a cool judgement and to disengage from a problem which had defeated 
and marred the reputation of every British Minister who touched it.’12   
 
Mayhew’s own statements on the matter were contradictory, to say the least.  In an 
interview with Al Hayat newspaper in 1990, he expressed the view that 
 
[Bevin] wasn’t racially prejudiced, not at all…. He was emotionally outraged 
by the tactics of Zionism – by their terrorism, by their deception, by the 
monstrous pressure brought on the British government by the American 
government as a result of the pressure of the American Jewish community.’13 
 
It is difficult to see how this judgment can sit comfortably with the appraisal that 
Mayhew had committed to his diary in 1948.  ‘I must make a note about Ernest’s anti-
semitism,’ he had written, ‘There is no doubt, to my mind that Ernest detests Jews.’14 
 
If Mayhew, wisely enough, wished to distance himself from Bevin’s more 
intemperate outbursts, it was not long before he developed his own ‘pronounced 
distaste for Zionist methods of pressure and propaganda.’15  The death threat that he 
received in 1946 from the Stern Gang undoubtedly coloured his judgement and he 
would refer to the incident for the rest of his career.  In 1980, for example, he wrote to 
offer support to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, during a period of strained 
Anglo-Israeli relations.  ‘Although Begin and Shamir have spoken rudely about you,’ 
he observed, ‘they have not threatened to assassinate you as they did to Ernie Bevin 
and me in the old days.  Their manners are improving as the years go by and we 
should be truly thankful.’16  In the event, Mayhew’s work at the Foreign Office was 
ended not by a Zionist assassin, but as the more prosaic consequence of the electors of 
South Norfolk depriving him of his seat in the 1950 general election.
17
 
 
It was upon visiting Jordan in 1953 that Mayhew gained his first experience of the 
bitterness that pervaded the Palestinian refugee camps.
18
  In his memoirs he expressed 
regret that he had not begun campaigning for the Palestinians upon his return to 
Britain.  In fact, it was only a decade later, following a 1963 trip to Israel that 
Mayhew became actively committed to the Palestinian cause.
19
  He found Prime 
Minister, Levi Eshkol, to be ‘brash and aggressive’ and dismissed Foreign Minister, 
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Golda Meir, somewhat condescendingly, as ‘a disappointing woman rather superficial 
in mind and temperament.’20  Meir, he remarked, related to Palestinians solely as 
‘drivers, gardeners and houseboys’ and possessed a ‘colonial settler’s attitude’ similar 
to that of British settlers in East Africa.
21
  Mayhew came to believe that his clashes 
with Israeli leaders during the course of this visit explained Wilson’s decision to keep 
him away from the Foreign Office after the 1964 General Election.  ‘Of course the 
Israelis complained to my party leader about my attitude on this visit in 1963,’ he 
claimed, ‘and this had a considerably adverse effect.’22  Philip Ziegler, in his 1993 
biography of Wilson, lent support to this claim.  ‘Mayhew, he wrote, ‘was convinced 
that Wilson’s recollection of this fracas explained why he was not offered a job in the 
Foreign Office when the Labour Government was formed in 1964.  Probably he was 
right.’23 
 
Mayhew may not have achieved his desired return to the Foreign Office, but he did 
return to office as Minister for the Navy.  Thereafter, official duties limited his 
opportunities to campaign on Middle Eastern questions until, in a protest against 
proposed naval cuts, he resigned from the government in February 1966.  The 
following year, he embarked on a tour of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and 
Egypt at the invitation of the Arab League.
24
  The timing was portentous.  In June 
1967 the third Arab-Israeli war burst onto the international stage and Mayhew was 
transformed into a very public advocate for the Arab cause. 
 
On Monday 5 June, the opening day of the ‘Six Day’ war, Mayhew appeared on the 
BBC television programme, Panorama, along with the Liberal Party leader, Jeremy 
Thorpe, and the Conservative MP, Duncan Sandys.  Mayhew’s remarks were not 
especially contentious.  He declared himself, somewhat disingenuously, to be 
‘completely torn’ on the Arab-Israeli conflict, stating that he felt ‘desperately sad for 
both sides.’  Insofar as he engaged in any pro-Arab advocacy it was simply to state 
that ‘I think there is an Arab case as well as an Israeli case’ and to claim that ‘the 
Israelis are the aggressors’ since Israel had initiated hostilities on 5 June (although he 
accepted that the Arab states were responsible for provoking the crisis in May).
25
  
These remarks incurred a hostile response from within the Labour Party.  On 7 June, a 
group of MPs associated with the Labour Friends of Israel group wrote to the Chief 
Whip complaining that Panorama had given the false impression that ‘Mayhew’s 
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views represented the position of the Parliamentary Labour Party.’26  In his diary, 
Crossman noted that the Cabinet had discussed ‘the prejudice displayed by the BBC 
broadcasts’ and remarked that ‘Party members had been infuriated that the sole 
Labour representative...was that fanatical pro-Arab, Christopher Mayhew.’27  In the 
same period, Mayhew clashed with the Party’s Jewish MPs (in one BBC interview he 
called them ‘the Israeli army below the gangway’28) and Manny Shinwell, during a 
particularly stormy confrontation, advised him in no uncertain terms to ‘go back to 
Nasser.’29 
 
The inspiration for the creation of the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) came 
from the successful establishment, in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War, of  
the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU), a cross-
party organisation for the promotion of Arab and, particularly, Palestinian interests.  
The Conservative and Labour MPs, Ian Gilmour and Colin Jackson, served as the first 
joint-Chairmen while Mayhew was involved from the outset as a Vice-Chairman.  
Other prominent CAABU founders included the former Conservative Minister, Sir 
Anthony Nutting, John Reddaway (whose brother, Norman, Mayhew knew well from 
their time together in the Special Operations Executive and the Information Research 
Department), and the journalist, Michael Adams, who directed the organisation’s 
media and publicity work. 
 
Mayhew later acknowledged that CAABU had been instrumental in encouraging him 
to set up LMEC in 1969
30
 and, from the outset, he saw LMEC as a mechanism for 
bringing about a decisive change in the Labour movement’s approach to the Arab-
Israel conflict.
31
   In an appeal to Mohamed Heykal, the editor of Egypt’s Al Ahram 
newspaper and a close ally of President Nasser, Mayhew defined LMEC’s purpose as 
being to build up ‘an effective resistance to the powerful Zionist propaganda and 
pressure,’ which, he claimed, had ‘so far dominated the Labour movement.’32  LMEC 
quickly recruited nearly 30 Labour MPs to its ranks and among its early sponsors 
could be found CAABU regulars like Fenner Brockway, Colin Jackson, David 
Watkins, Elizabeth Collard and Andrew Faulds, as well as high-profile Labour Party 
figures such as Woodrow Wyatt and Michael Foot.  A successful Greater London 
Regional Conference was organised in April 1969 and LMEC made its debut at the 
Labour Party Conference later that year. Plans to establish regular speakers’ panels, a 
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newsletter and an information service were rapidly put in train
33
 and, by 1972, the 
membership of LMEC had grown to 160.
34
 
 
LMEC’s activities can be divided into three major types. Firstly, the organisation 
worked to influence individuals and groups within the Labour Party and the trade 
union movement. This involved the distribution of publicity material as well as more 
costly enterprises such as organising visits to the Middle East for groups and 
individuals.  Secondly, LMEC, sometimes under the auspices of CAABU, sometimes 
independently, sought make direct approaches to government officials and to 
influence public opinion through the media.  Thirdly, as LMEC’s influence grew, its 
members began to cooperate with more radical British organisations and links were 
established with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). 
 
During the 1970s, three attempts to establish a formal association with the Labour 
Party were rejected by the National Executive Committee although this did at least 
provide ammunition for publicity about the ‘Zionist pressures’ that LMEC members 
believed to be dominating the Labour movement.  Mayhew wrote to all Constituency 
Parties criticising the Labour Party for continuing to accept Poale Zion as an affiliated 
group while refusing to recognise ‘a body pledged to a more balanced approach and to 
the support of United Nations’ resolutions.’35  Failure to gain acceptance as a formally 
affiliated Labour Party organisation did not hamper LMEC’s lobbying activity.  In 
June 1972, an LMEC policy statement entitled ‘British Policy on the Middle East’ 
was distributed to the Foreign Secretary, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, the 
International Committee of the Labour Party and all Labour MPs.  This statement 
attributed the failure to achieve a peace settlement to ‘Israeli intransigence and 
American bias’ and proposed a British policy based on dissociation from US 
leadership in the region, a strong commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 242 
and a warning to Israel that Britain would not tolerate settlements in the occupied 
territories.
36
  A draft resolution based on these principles was despatched to all 
Constituency Labour Parties with an invitation for them to consider submitting it to 
the annual Party Conference.
37
   
 
In April 1973, LMEC produced a major memorandum, drafted by Mayhew, for the 
International Committee of the National Executive Committee (NEC).  Entitled ‘The 
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Labour Party and the Middle East,’ it called for ‘a radical reappraisal’ of policy and ‘a 
revision of the Party’s traditional support for Israel and Zionism.’  In a revealing 
paragraph which hinted at Britain’s vulnerability to the Arab ‘oil weapon’, it was 
noted that ‘In contrast with Tories, who have shown some limited understanding of 
Arab aspirations, the Party is distrusted in the Arab world and should take decisive 
steps to improve its standing there.’38  Toughening the line taken in the June 1972 
statement, LMEC now voiced support for UN General Assembly Resolution 2949 (far 
stronger in its criticism of Israel than Security Council Resolution 242) and called for 
the Party to accept a ‘substantial British contingent in any security force created under 
UN auspices to aid the implementation of ...UN resolutions.’  The paper shied away 
from advocating recognition of the PLO, opting instead for the more ambiguous 
proposal that Labour should cultivate ‘contacts with the Arabs as well as Israelis – 
and especially with the Palestinians whose plight remains at the centre of the Middle 
East unrest.’39  It is certainly arguable that LMEC’s efforts influenced the NEC.  
Upon the outbreak of the October 1973 war, the NEC issued a statement which, whilst 
expressing sympathy and understanding with ‘Israel’s single-minded determination to 
preserve her security,’ also levelled some unusually sharp criticisms. ‘A total reliance 
on military strength can only lead to the kind of grimly militaristic and rigid social 
organisation which disfigures so many other countries already,’ it declared, adding 
that ‘a concern with Security cannot justify the retention of territories occupied during 
the conflicts with her Arab neighbours, nor their integration into Israel’s economic 
structure.’40   
 
Away from the Labour Party’s policymaking bureaucracy, the trade unions emerged 
as another battleground in LMEC’s bid to transform the attitudes of the Labour 
movement.  Mayhew and his allies could have been forgiven for regarding this arena 
as an unpromising one since, in the 1960s, Trades Union Congress (TUC) leaders 
were regarded as strongly pro-Israel.  In 1967, Israel’s trade union organisation, the 
Histadrut, invited TUC representatives to Israel and the TUC despatched its General 
Secretary, Frank Cousins, and Fred Hayday, chairman of its international committee 
as part of a ‘deliberate high-level attempt to mediate in the Middle East conflict.’41  
That such lofty ambitions produced so few results is no great surprise, but the episode 
illustrates how the TUC’s attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict was likely to clash 
with those of Mayhew’s fledgling LMEC.  Britain’s Ambassador in Tel Aviv, 
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Michael Hadow, concluded that ‘the Israelis must be well satisfied with having 
arranged this visit and with its results’42 and his Labour Attaché, O.J. Skinner, added 
that Hayday and Cousins had left him ‘in no doubt of their sympathy and support for 
Israel.’43  Back in London, comments by the TUC officials prompted the Foreign 
Office’s Sir John Moberly to describe the duo as ‘well and truly brainwashed.’44 
 
Nevertheless, LMEC did establish a foothold in the trade union movement.  It helped 
that the Foreign Office was also seeking to push the TUC towards a greater 
understanding of Arab viewpoints.  In 1967, Hadow expressed concern that the Arab 
case was ‘largely going by default in important Trade Union circles’45 and Eastern 
Department’s Anthony Moore pressed for closer links between the TUC and trade 
unions in the Arab world on the grounds that these would ‘counter the strong 
influence of the Histadrut with General Council members which tends to lead the 
TUC to take a rather one-sided view of Arab/Israel affairs.’46  There is evidence, 
however, that the TUC’s pro-Israel position was not as solid as some believed and in 
January 1968 George Foggon, the Foreign Office’s overseas labour adviser, reported 
a conversation with Frank Cousins in which the latter had expressed ‘disappointment’ 
with Israel and concern about elements of Israeli policy.  ‘They have not been too 
happy about a number of aspects of Israel’s policy since the “six day war”,’ noted 
Foggon, particularly ‘since they saw the refugee problem in Jordan and had an 
opportunity to talk with some of those still crossing from the west bank.’47 
 
In April 1969, Mayhew invited the TUC to send representatives to LMEC’s first 
major conference.  The TUC declined, citing the short notice given, but it did express 
a willingness to receive any LMEC documents produced in support of the event.
48
  
Progress, perhaps predictably, was slow.  By May 1973, LMEC’s Executive 
Committee noted that ‘much more effort must be made to interest the trade union 
movement in [our] aims.’  A more persistent lobbying campaign then began, with 
prominent trade union leaders invited to attend LMEC events and dinners, while 
Elizabeth Collard was charged with the task of sending relevant press and publicity 
materials to the various trade union journals.
49
  Activities were stepped up again in 
1975 when Roger Ward joined LMEC’s Executive Committee, establishing a 
specialist trade union section.  Ward sponsored trade union delegation visits to Egypt, 
Iraq and Syria in December 1975 and Algeria in February 1976.  Both he and the new 
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LMEC Chairman, David Watkins were delighted with the results observing that the 
‘FCO seemed a bit amazed by it all’ when LMEC pulled off the coup of arranging 
visits to Egypt by high-level delegations from the Association of Scientific, Technical 
and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) and the General and Municipal Workers Union 
(GMWU) in September 1976.  ‘Our work in this field is becoming quite widely 
recognised,’ Ward told Watkins, drawing attention to an invitation he had received to 
a dinner hosted by the Egyptian Ambassador and attended by Jack Jones, the General 
Secretary of the Transport and General Workers’ Union and a delegation from 
Egyptian Transport Workers’ Union.50  Sending trade union delegations to the Middle 
East was expensive and Ward acknowledged in November 1977 that his trade union 
activities were using up a large proportion of the Council’s funds.  A meeting of 
LMEC’s Executive Committee, however, agreed that ‘the expenditure was 
worthwhile.’51  This pioneering work laid the foundations for the establishment, in 
June 1980, of the Trade Union Friends of Palestine, an organisation soon noted for the 
flamboyant anti-Zionist rhetoric of its ambitious General Secretary, George 
Galloway.
52
  Indeed, the transformation of trade union attitudes prompted the 
establishment, in 1983, of a Trade Union Friends of Israel organisation and the 
appointment, for the first time in fifteen years, of a full-time Histadrut representative 
to the UK.  Arriving in Britain, the Israeli official described the situation as ‘chilling’ 
and noted that the views of some unions were expressed with ‘verbal violence of a 
kind he had not heard in years.’  ‘Literature published by the...Trade Union Friends of 
Palestine,’ he reported, ‘is to be seen everywhere at trade union conferences and 
meetings.’53  
 
In its media campaigns, LMEC was generally content to allow CAABU, with its 
greater resources and higher public profile, to play the more active role.  Since so 
many LMEC members also subscribed to CAABU, it was convenient for the latter to 
facilitate their media appearances and sponsor their publications.  When the 
entrepreneurial publisher, Claud Morris, decided to launch a magazine intended to 
provide a forum for pro-Arab opinion, it was to CAABU personnel like Mayhew, 
Adams, Reddaway and Nutting that he turned.
54
  The result was Middle East 
International, the first edition of which appeared in April 1971 and to which LMEC 
figures like Mayhew made frequent contributions.  Meanwhile, LMEC members 
worked tirelessly writing letters to newspaper editors, producing opinion columns in 
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the press and appearing as guest experts on television and radio programmes.  The 
BBC was regarded as a particularly important target and, at a November 1973 
meeting of CAABU’s General Committee, tactics for ‘attacking’ the Corporation 
were considered in some detail.  As the meeting considered how ‘young and ignorant’ 
BBC producers ‘fell victim to ‘Zionist propaganda,’ Mayhew argued that it was 
important to direct pressure at top-level journalists and controllers.’55  One result of 
this meeting was that the BBC’s correspondent in Jerusalem, Michael Elkins, who 
CAABU denounced as ‘a dedicated and extreme kind of Zionist,’56 would find 
himself on the receiving end of organised CAABU attacks for the rest of the decade.
57
 
 
If, in public, CAABU and LMEC personnel sometimes found it politically expedient 
to exaggerate the extent of ‘Zionist influence’ upon the British media, they were 
privately satisfied with the results of their own media work.  In the aftermath of the 
1973 war, CAABU formally thanked its members for the letters that had been written 
to newspaper, radio and television editors and noted that ‘their number has been so 
great that it has not always been easy to acknowledge the copies sent to the office.’  
The result, CAABU believed, was that ‘press (including radio and television) 
coverage of the recent fighting...has been noticeably fairer than in 1967.’58  ‘Directly 
and indirectly,’ Mayhew would later write, ‘CAABU...had a profound impact on 
British perceptions of the Palestine problem.’59  
 
An early sign that LMEC and CAABU were developing contacts with more radical 
pro-Palestinian groups can be seen in their members’ association with the Free 
Palestine newspaper in the 1970s.  Free Palestine had begun life as a ‘violent and 
crudely written’60 newsletter in 1968 and indirect links to CAABU were established 
when Claud Morris agreed to publish the newspaper in 1969.  That business 
relationship proved to be short-lived but the newspaper continued to cultivate links 
with British MPs and activists.  Its editor, Louis Eaks, brought his own connections to 
the Young Liberal ‘Red Guard’ faction, and Free Palestine received political support 
and journalistic contributions from LMEC regulars like Mayhew, Watkins and Faulds. 
 
Morris later claimed not to have been aware of Free Palestine’s links to Arafat and 
the PLO when he agreed to publish the newspaper in 1969.
61
  Those connections, 
however, are not especially difficult to uncover.  A February 1975 editorial stated that 
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Free Palestine’s line was ‘determined by the political and strategy decisions of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation and Al Fatah’ whilst asserting that ‘this newspaper 
is not funded by either of these organisations.’62  In 1981, inviting Andrew Faulds to 
join the editorial committee, Eaks claimed that Free Palestine was ‘independent of 
any specific Palestinian organisation’ although he noted that the newspaper was 
‘committed to the Fatah/PLO line.’63  A closer look at the newspaper’s parent 
company, Petra Publishing, however, reveals that among the firm’s directors was 
Khaled al-Hassan (Abu Said), a founding member of Fatah and one of Arafat’s closest 
advisers. Another director was Saleh Khalili, who was also a member of Free 
Palestine’s editorial committee.  Khalili has been identified by Alex Mitchell as a 
London-based agent of Abu Jihad, head of the PLO’s military operations.64 According 
to Mitchell, Khalili’s job as the PLO’s ‘man-at-large in London’ brought him into 
collaborative liaison with Gerry Healey’s Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP), 
whose publications were subsidised by Libya’s Colonel Gadhaffi, and, through the 
WRP, to the Lambeth Council leader, Ted Knight, who sat alongside Ken Livingstone 
on the editorial board of the Labour Herald newspaper.  Mitchell has even claimed 
that Knight met with Arafat, Abu Jihad and Khalili in Tunis and succeeded in 
soliciting a £15,000 donation to the Labour Herald from the PLO.
65
  Whatever the 
truth of that, it is certainly clear that much of the Labour Herald’s content was, in its 
anti-Zionism, scarcely distinguishable from that of Free Palestine. 
 
Free Palestine was also connected to the Palestine Action group, founded by Ghada 
Karmi in June 1972.  It was Eaks who first informed Andrew Faulds of plans to 
establish ‘an anti-Apartheid type of organisation’ to lobby on behalf of the 
Palestinians ‘within the Labour, Communist and Liberal parties’ in April 1972,66 and 
the new group’s political platform included support for: 
 
1. The restitution of all the rights of the Palestinians, especially the right to 
return to their homes. 
2. The creation of a unitary, secular, democratic Palestine in which all citizens 
have equal rights irrespective of race or creed. 
3. The struggle of the Palestinians for the liberation of their homeland.
67
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LMEC considered the desirability of cooperation with Palestine Action at a meeting 
of its Executive Committee in October.  Evidently, there were doubts about the 
wisdom of a formal association and, noting that ‘an approach had been made to 
LMEC to support the newly formed Palestine Action group’, it was ruled that ‘no 
official support should be given to this movement.’68  However, whilst LMEC 
resolved to keep its distance from Palestine Action, there were no such restrictions 
upon individual members.  Indeed, Andrew Faulds, a member of LMEC’s Executive 
Committee since January 1973,
69
 became far more than a passive supporter of 
Palestine Action.  In December 1973, Karmi wrote to Faulds to confirm that ‘you 
have been elected President of Palestine Action at our AGM’; an honorary position 
that Faulds happily accepted.
70
 
 
Faulds played a key role in a major breakthrough for Palestine Action at the BBC.  It 
came in the form of a television programme, ‘The Right to Return’, broadcast on 26 
November 1976 as part of BBC 2’s ‘Open Door’ series. Faulds presented the 
programme, overseeing guest appearances from David Watkins and the anti-apartheid 
campaigner and Young Liberal chairman, Peter Hain.  A few days after the broadcast, 
Karmi reported that no less a PLO luminary than Abu Lutof (Farouk Kaddoumi) had 
praised the programme as ‘the best film he had ever seen on the Palestine issue’71 and 
CAABU’s John Reddaway also congratulated Faulds for making ‘a notable 
contribution towards the exposition and defence of Palestinian rights.’72  
Unsurprisingly, the programme provoked a deeply hostile response from British 
Jewish organisations and the Israeli press, with one newspaper reporting that ‘last 
weekend, the most extremist anti-Israeli programme ever shown on Western 
television was screened by the BBC.’73 In its March 1977 newsletter, Palestine Action 
described the film as ‘a striking success’ and stated that ‘we have been overwhelmed 
with letters of support, donations, requests to join Palestine Action, and enquiries for 
further information about the Palestinians and their cause.’74  Faulds even received 
congratulations note from a Scottish National Party activist who informed him that 
‘The political, economic and cultural suppression of the Palestinian Arab has its direct 
historical parallel in the land of Scotland since the Union.’75  This proved a step too 
far for Faulds.  ‘I would not...wish to go along with your comparison of Palestine and 
Scotland,’ he replied, ‘As a Labour Member of Parliament, I do not think you would 
expect me to agree with the SNP.’76 
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In their press and publicity work, Mayhew, his allies in CAABU and LMEC, and their 
associates in groups like Palestine Action, developed a campaigning language of anti-
Zionism which proved to be both hugely influential and highly controversial.  
Certainly, the presence of racial themes in the arguments being propounded made for 
highly combustible political material and there are interesting echoes of Enoch 
Powell’s racial rhetoric in some of the material associated with leading LMEC figures 
like Mayhew and Faulds.  Mayhew was certainly prepared to exploit domestic 
political controversies on race and immigration as a springboard for attacks on Israel 
and Zionism.  Appearing on the BBC’s ‘The World Today’ programme in 1968, he 
stated that 
 
I never felt it was right to ask us to impose on the Arab world hundreds of 
thousands of Jewish immigrants.  And if I may say so, if it’s not irrelevant, the 
controversy about immigration in Britain today, when we are asked to have in 
Britain a comparatively negligible number of immigrants and yet we visited 
on the Arab world with force of arms, comparatively millions of people of 
different religion, different custom, different race.
77
 
 
Intriguingly, Richard Crossman had anticipated this kind of argument twenty years 
earlier.  English anti-Zionism, he suggested, was based on a deep fear of invasion.  
‘The Englishman thinks of Zionism as something synthetic and unnatural,’ he wrote, 
adding that Zionism appeared as ‘the product of high powered American 
propaganda.’78  As Shindler has noted, such formulations led many Englishmen to 
look at Palestine and see ‘the Arab as defending his 1,000-year old civilization against 
the invader.’79  Another racial theme popularised by Mayhew (and one which Shlomo 
Sands’ writings have done much to revive in recent years) was the idea that the 
Jewish connection to the land of Israel was erroneous.  In a 1970 speech to the 
Institute of Race Relations, Mayhew wondered aloud whether the ‘true descendants’ 
of the Jews who were dispersed from Palestine two thousand years ago were in fact 
the Palestinian Arabs.  ‘I would like the Institute to consider the proposition,’ he 
concluded, ‘that Mrs. Golda Meir is most unlikely to have ancestors who once lived in 
Palestine, and far less likely to have such ancestors than Yasser Arafat.’80 
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Mayhew also did much to develop the South African apartheid analogy in connection 
with the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  An early example of this came in 1969, when 
Mayhew was lobbying against the possibility of Harold Wilson and Denis Healey 
authorising the sale of Chieftain tanks to Israel.  ‘I simply can’t believe,’ he wrote in a 
letter to his old IRD comrade, Norman Reddaway, that ‘the British Government 
would be so stupid as to provide the Israelis with weapons to use in the conquered 
Arab territories – perhaps even, Sharpeville-style – against Arab civilians there.’81  In 
a June 1971 article for the Fabian journal, Venture, he argued that, ‘for a growing 
minority of Labour people, support for Israel and Zionism is as difficult as support for 
South Africa and apartheid and for very similar reasons.’ Should not the Labour 
Party, he asked, ‘criticise Zionism with the same force and conviction as it denounces 
apartheid?’82  The cry of ‘Israeli apartheid’ soon became a staple feature of British 
anti-Zionism.  Writing in Free Palestine under the headline ‘Palestine must win’, 
Peter Hain likened Harold Wilson’s views on Israel to ‘statements rationalising and 
condoning racialism by right-wingers returning from South Africa.’  The radicalism 
of Hain’s position at this time can be gauged from his rejection of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 and his assertion that ‘the case for the replacement of Israel 
by a democratic, secular state of Palestine must be put uncompromisingly.’83  
Mayhew struck a slightly more moderate tone in his communications with Foreign 
Secretary, Jim Callaghan, questioning whether any ‘catalogue of morally offensive 
regimes’ to which the Labour Government should be opposed (among which he 
named Greece, Portugal, Chile and South Africa) should not include ‘that which Israel 
has established in the Arab territories occupied since 1967.’84 
 
The tactic of equating Zionism with Nazism was another distasteful feature of the 
emerging language of anti-Zionist activism.  Such imagery was not itself new (it can 
be found in British press condemnation of groups like the Irgun and the Stern Gang in 
Palestine after World War II
85
) but there was something more calculated about the use 
of Nazi imagery as a means of delegitimising Zionism in the 1970s.  Mayhew 
certainly flirted with the analogy, writing in 1971 that ‘Germans who massacre Jews 
are tried and executed. Jews who massacre Arabs are elected to political leadership’86 
and he greeted Menachem Begin’s 1977 election victory with the observation that ‘It 
must be hard for Arabs to understand a country in which Germans who have 
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massacred Jews are tried as war criminals while Jews who have massacred Arabs are 
elected Prime Minister.’87 
 
Free Palestine pioneered visual representations of the Zionism-Nazism analogy.  The 
front page of its April 1975 issue was adorned with the image of a Palestinian 
prisoner reaching out from a prison cell window, the bars of which formed the shape 
of a swastika.
88
  Ken Livingstone’s Labour Herald newspaper adopted the ‘Zionism 
equals Nazism’ trope with equal enthusiasm in the 1980s; perhaps the most notorious 
example being the 1982 cartoon which, under the caption ‘The Final Solution’, 
depicted Israel’s Prime Minister, Menachem Begin in SS uniform, standing atop a 
mound of bloodied corpses, making a Nazi salute.
89
  A dangerous feature of such 
imagery was that it brought Palestinian activists into contact with views and 
individuals more usually associated with the far right.  In 1989, Faulds received a 
letter from David Irving warning him ‘not to accept any wartime atrocity stories at 
face value’ and informing him that ‘even the notorious “gas chambers” are now 
turning out to have a been a fiction.’90  There is no evidence to suggest that Faulds 
replied to this letter, let alone agreed with its content, but it is telling that he saw 
nothing to object to in another overtly anti-Semitic letter from a constituent who 
remarked that ‘it is readily forgotten that Jewish financiers created the German 
monster’ and that ‘Judaism (Zionism) is as racially exclusive as the “master race” 
“chosen people” and just as ruthless against the Palestinian people.’91  Replying to 
this letter, Faulds saw fit only to thank his correspondent for ‘your support for my 
anti-Zionist position’ and to remark that it was ‘extraordinary how the Zionist 
propagandists manage to con public and international opinion.’92 
 
The notion that British Jews possessed ‘dual’ or ‘divided’ national loyalties, a theme 
with a long and problematic history, was also revived by Mayhew and (to his political 
cost) Faulds in the 1967-1973 period.  Mayhew clashed with the Chief Rabbi, 
Immanuel Jakobovits after publishing an article in which he had criticised Jakobovits 
for addressing British Jews ‘almost as if he and they were Israeli nationals’ and 
warning that ‘any suggestion that a particular section of the British people has rights 
and duties in respect of a foreign government which the rest of the people do not have 
is dangerous.’93  In a sharp response, Jakobovits castigated Mayhew for ‘sowing the 
seeds of strife and bitterness’ and explained that 
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The profound concern of Jews the world over for the survival of Israel and its 
2½ million Jews had nothing whatever to do with dual loyalties.... Jews 
offered their services and their fortunes to Israel not out of any loyalty to its 
Government, but solely out of the human obligation to stand by brothers, in 
their hour of need; that while, as British Jews, Britain was our country to 
which we owed and paid our exclusive political loyalties, Israel was our 
people to whose rescue we would come in the same way as you would be 
expected to save any brother of yours when in danger, whatever his nationality 
might be.
94
 
 
 
Faulds’ pronouncements on the ‘divided loyalties’ of British Jews would lead to his 
removal from the Shadow Cabinet in November 1973.  He had already incurred 
Wilson’s displeasure after a 1972 Parliamentary debate in which he remarked that ‘it 
is time some of our colleagues...forgot their dual loyalty to another country and 
another Parliament.  They are representatives here and not in the Knesset.’95  Despite 
a public rebuke from Wilson, Faulds returned to this theme in October 1973, 
informing MPs that the ‘Zionist propaganda machine’ was ‘a fifth column in every 
country of the world with a Jewish community,’ and stating that ‘that is why I talk of 
dual loyalties.’96  Wilson promptly sacked Faulds on the grounds that such language 
‘impugned the patriotism of Jewish Members of Parliament’ and constituted 
‘uncomradely behaviour.’97  LMEC, in contrast, released a statement claiming that 
‘many party colleagues will sympathise with Andrew Faulds’ and noting that 
‘Zionism...calls on Jewish people everywhere for acts of loyalty towards Israel.  
When the interests of Israel conflict with the interests of the nation to which these 
Jewish people belong, this inevitably creates divided loyalties.’98  Accusations against 
British Jews on the grounds of ‘divided loyalties’ recurred at regular intervals 
thereafter, most recently in comments made by the Labour MP for Newport West, 
Paul Flynn, who in 2011 questioned whether a ‘Zionist’ could serve as British 
Ambassador to Israel with the same effectiveness as ‘someone with roots in the UK 
[who] can't be accused of having Jewish loyalty.’99 
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A final theme which characterised much of the new rhetoric was an emphasis on the 
conspiratorial nature of Zionism and its supporters.  ‘The Jews,’ Mayhew had written 
in an ill-judged moment in 1967, ‘are about the world’s best propagandists and 
pushers’100 and, addressing a UN forum in 1983, he complained that the US Congress 
had ‘been bought by a foreign government.’101  He even believed that his publishing 
fortunes had been undermined by ‘Jewish pressure,’ complaining that sales of his 
1987 autobiography suffered because ‘so many Jewish supporters of Israel are literary 
editors, reviewers, members of library committees and so on.’102  Faulds, too, was 
quick to see conspiratorial hands at work, reportedly complaining to Tam Dalyell that 
the ‘Jewish Labour establishment’ had ‘cost him a peerage.’103  David Watkins’ 
writings on the history of ‘Zionist infiltration’ of the Labour Party have also been 
criticised by subsequent scholars as little more than ‘a crude conspiracy theory.’104  
The conclusion that this kind of rhetoric blurred the contested distinctions between 
anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism seems inescapable.  Yet, when Mayhew was moved 
to consider the question of anti-Semitism as a serious issue, he did so in such a way as 
to find Zionists guilty of causing the anti-Semitism of which they complained.  In 
1978, he warned that ‘the world’s growing hostility to Zionism will foster hostility to 
the Jewish people.... Zionism is an encouragement to anti-semitism.’105 The 
contemporary resonance of this kind of thinking can be seen in the film-maker Ken 
Loach’s 2009 assertion that ‘nothing has been a greater instigator of antisemitism than 
the self-proclaimed Jewish state itself.’106  Shlomo Avineri’s reminder that ‘Jews do 
not “cause” antisemitism – the antisemites do’ would seem to be a pertinent comment 
at this point.
107
  
 
The Legacy of Mayhew’s ‘Outcasts’ 
 
A brief survey of the political fortunes of the Labour Party’s most prominent pro-
Arab activists in the Wilson era might lead one to the conclusion that they enjoyed 
limited success, to say the least.  Margaret McKay, a prominent campaigner for 
Palestinian refugees in the late 1960s did not survive long enough as an MP to be able 
to play a major role in LMEC.  Frequent trips to the Middle East earned her a 
reputation in her Clapham constituency as ‘the woman on the Abu Dhabi omnibus’ 
and she was deselected by her constituency party before the 1970 General Election, 
whereupon she promptly retired to live in the United Arab Emirates.
108
  Andrew 
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Faulds’ sacking in 1973 did not end his front-bench career (he served as Labour’s arts 
spokesman under Michael Foot between 1979 and 1982) but his outspoken nature 
earned him a range of enemies stretching from Jewish MPs like Greville Janner to the 
left-wing firebrand, Dennis Skinner.
109
  A lack of unity within LMEC circles did not 
help, and Faulds’ obvious antipathy towards David Watkins, who he described in 
characteristically colourful language as ‘a dreadful prick,’ led him to boycott CAABU 
during the period in which Watkins directed the organisation in the 1980s.
110
  The title 
of Watkins’ own political memoir, Seventeen Years in Obscurity, hardly suggests that 
the CAABU Director’s parliamentary career had been particularly auspicious.  
Mayhew, meanwhile, distrusted by the leadership and scorned as a closet Tory by the 
left,
111
 grew increasingly disaffected.  There were whispers of rebellion, though these 
were hardly taken very seriously and, upon hearing rumours that Mayhew might 
challenge for the Labour leadership, Wilson reportedly noted that ‘if he does stand, it 
will be the first time in history that an Arab has been crucified.’112  In July 1974, 
thoroughly disillusioned, Mayhew defected to the Liberals, establishing the Liberal 
Middle East Council, a group that would attract the support of future party leader, 
David Steel.
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Yet, if individual careers stalled, the pro-Palestinian movement within the Labour 
movement continued to flourish.  In his memoirs, Mayhew noted that by the time of 
his defection to the Liberals, ‘the Labour Middle East Council was making good 
progress in detaching the party from its unbalanced support for Zionism’114 and, in a 
1992 booklet celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of CAABU’s establishment, he 
gave credit to LMEC for having ‘challenged and in due course defeated the Zionists’ 
dominance.’115  If the growth in pro-Palestinian activism in the 1980s was boosted by 
the hostile international reaction to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, it is also 
clear that plans for extending the network of Palestinian solidarity groups were in 
place well before that time.  Ghada Karmi, perhaps mindful of LMEC’s original 
reluctance to associate itself with Palestine Action, approached Faulds as early as 
May 1974 about the possibility of creating a Labour Friends of Palestine group.
116
  
The British Anti-Zionist Organisation (BAZO), dedicated to countering what it called 
‘the Zionist stranglehold on the British media and public opinion’ and espousing a 
brand of revolutionary anti-imperialism characterised by statements such as ‘only 
reactionary apartheid and imperialist powers still support the expansionist Zionist 
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state of Israel’ was founded in Glasgow in October 1975,117 establishing itself as a 
controversial presence on British campuses.
118
  Upon the outbreak of the 1982 
Lebanon war, Ernie Ross, MP for Dundee West and the driving force (along with 
George Galloway) behind the twinning of Dundee with the West Bank city of 
Nablus,
119
 established an anti-Israeli coalition, the Emergency Committee Against 
Invasion of Lebanon (ECAIL).  ECAIL, which held its inaugural meeting in the 
House of Commons on 24 July 1982, counted among its sponsors not only CAABU 
and the Labour, Liberal and Conservative Middle East Councils, but also the Trade 
Union Friends of Palestine, the Communist Party of Great Britain, a host of other 
union and student groups as well as regional and local ‘Friends of Palestine’ 
associations.
120
  Ken Livingstone’s Greater London Council, meanwhile, lent support 
to a newly-formed ‘Labour Committee on Palestine’ which, at its founding conference 
in November 1982, condemned ‘the racist and expansionist policies of the state of 
Israel and its role as an agent of imperialism.’121  A ‘Labour Friends of Palestine’ 
group was finally established within the Party in February 1986,
 122
 initially under the 
stewardship of Harry Cohen and Joan Maynard, whose inflexible adherence to 
socialist principles earned her the sobriquet ‘Stalin’s Grandmother.’123 
 
One of the ironies of the creation of this pro-Palestinian network was that Mayhew, a 
dedicated anti-Communist and a politician of a determinedly centrist ideological 
persuasion, should have laid the foundations for a cluster of organisations which, in 
the 1980s, provided a stronghold within the Labour movement for groups and 
individuals associated with a resurgent ‘hard’ left.  Mayhew was aware of this danger 
as early as 1968 and expressed concerns about the International Conference in 
Support of the Arab People to be held in Cairo in January 1969; a gathering which 
had attracted the interest of CAABU.  At a meeting with the Foreign Office’s G.G. 
Arthur, Mayhew asked, somewhat mischievously, whether it was the kind of 
conference ‘which he had spent his time subverting when he was responsible for 
IRD.’  Arthur replied that it was, whereupon Mayhew noted that ‘if it was in any way 
communist-inspired, he would not go.’124 
 
By the early 1980s, now a life peer in the House of Lords, Mayhew found himself 
facing this kind of problem on a regular basis.   Even CAABU seemed vulnerable to 
infiltration from the left and Mayhew warned in 1981 that ‘we are faced with a 
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“Bennite” threat.... It is essential that we safeguard the Council’s integrity.’125  When 
Ross invited Mayhew to address an ECAIL rally at Hyde Park, Mayhew refused on 
the grounds that he was not prepared to share a platform with the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party.  ‘If the PLO’s cause is to flourish in Britain,’ he warned, ‘it 
really must keep its distance from these extremely unpopular and unrepresentative 
organisations.’126  This warning should have resonated with Ross, who had already 
been forced to move for the expulsion of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign group 
from ECAIL after reports that its members had associated themselves with pro-IRA 
chants at a rally in West Belfast.  ‘It is quite clear,’ Ross told Faulds in August 1982, 
‘that unless we take immediate, firm action with Palestine Solidarity Campaign, their 
continuing membership of the Committee will not only bring the Committee into 
disrepute, but...may well lead to individual organisations being forced to withdraw 
from the Committee itself.’127 
 
Mayhew, an outcast from the Labour Party, was now in danger of a self-imposed exile 
from the anti-Zionist network he had done so much to create.  Labour’s new 
generation of activists built upon Mayhew’s organisational structures and adopted his 
language of anti-Zionism but many did so in the name of a left-wing radicalism that 
he utterly rejected.  It is true that there remained a number of dedicated Conservative 
Party adherents to the Palestinian cause, Ian Gilmour, Dennis Walters and Tony 
Marlow prominent among them, and we can certainly detect Mayhew’s influence in 
the pronouncements of Liberal Democrat politicians like Jenny Tonge and, more 
clumsily, David Ward.   It was on the left, however, that the pro-Palestinian 
movement really gained ground.  As David Cesarani has pointed out, while right wing 
anti-Zionism declined into ‘a species of pro-Arab sentimentalism’, it was ‘the mass-
based left [which] adopted anti-Zionism as a “poster issue”.’128  Mayhew’s dilemma 
was encapsulated by Colin Shindler, who observed that in the London of the 1980s, 
‘Liberals and centrists who favoured an amelioration of Palestinian sufferings and an 
outcome based on a two-state solution found themselves rubbing shoulders with 
Trotskyists and Stalinists who wanted nothing of the sort.’129 
 
Christopher Mayhew was a politician who presented himself as someone who could 
‘speak about the problem of left-wing take-overs of democratic organisations with 
longer practical experience than anyone else in the United Kingdom.’130  Yet the 
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element of anti-Zionist radicalism that he introduced to British politics had its greatest 
appeal to groups and individuals within the Labour movement who Mayhew would 
have regarded as his political enemies.  Mayhew succeeded in transforming the way 
in which the Labour Party engaged with the Israel-Palestinian question but, in so 
doing, he unwittingly helped to create, within mainstream Labour politics, a coalition 
between anti-Zionism and the far-left which he would have regarded as neither 
desirable in itself, nor an effective strategy for the advancement of the Palestinian 
cause. 
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